Per Magnus Johansson, »Consolation and Psychoanalysis«

ABSTRACT

Psychoanalysis has seldom concerned itself with the notion of consolation at the theoretical level. Consolation (or comfort or solace) is not a psychoanalytic concept. Freud only uses the word once in his general reflections on the human condition.

Freud saw religion as an effect of man’s infantile need for consolation, and compared it with obsessional neuroses. His reflections on the matter led Freud to the conclusion that religion is an illusion. The more people who gain access to thinking influenced by science, the more people will abandon their belief in the religious message.

In Freud’s scientific-ideological attempt at turning psychoanalysis into a scientific discipline, phenomena which are parts of the religious and literary fields are lost. The human need for consolation is such a phenomenon.

Donald W. Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object must be considered in this context. According to Winnicott, the transitional object is on the border between psychic, subjective reality, and external, objective reality. It is usually used by the child of the age of four to twelve months. The transitional object is a compensation which has the function of consoling the individual.

In Sweden, as in many other European countries, the psychodynamic tradition that arose was to a greater extent concerned with fulfilling man’s need for consolation, as compared with pursuing an ideal that was influenced by the natural sciences. The psychotherapists in this tradition attended to man’s need for consolation, and the treatment was called pastoral cure.

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The relationship between psychoanalysis, the psychodynamic tradition, and mankind’s need for consolation is complex and multifaceted. Sigmund Freud’s position was that psychoanalysis belonged among the sciences, by which he meant, more precisely, the natural sciences. In Sweden, as in many other European countries, the psychodynamic tradition that arose was to a greater extent concerned with fulfilling man’s need for consolation, compared to pursuing an ideal that was influenced by the natural sciences. The psychotherapists in this tradition attended to man’s need for consolation and the treatment was called pastoral cure. These aspects of psychoanalysis are considered in the text. Moreover, the way in which the psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott introduced the concept of the transitional object is touched upon, specifically how this allowed him to address some of the issues that arose in the intersection between the psychotherapeutic ambition, the basic attitude of natural science, and the clinical experience that human beings never completely free themselves from the need for consolation.

In 1930, Freud wrote the following:

For a wide variety of reasons, it is very far from my intention to express an opinion upon the value of human civilization. I have endeavoured to guard myself against the enthusiastic prejudice which holds that our civilization is the most precious thing that we possess or could acquire and that its path will necessarily lead to heights of unimaginable perfection. I can at least listen without indignation to the critic who is of the opinion that when one surveys the aims of cultural endeavour and the means it employs, one is bound to come to the conclusion that the whole effort is not worth the trouble, and that the outcome of it can only be a state of affairs which the individual will be unable to tolerate. My impartiality is made all the easier to me by my knowing very little about all these things. One thing only do I know for certain and that is that man’s judgements of value follow directly his wishes for happiness – that, accordingly, they are an attempt to support his illusions with arguments. I should find it very understandable if someone were to point out the obligatory nature of the course of human civilization and were to say, for instance, that the tendencies to a restriction of sexual life or to the institution of a humanitarian ideal
at the expense of natural selection were developmental trends which cannot be adverted or turned aside and to which it is best for us to yield as though they were necessities of nature. I know, too, the objection that can be made against this, to the effect that in the history of mankind, trends such as these, which were considered insurmountable, have often been thrown aside and replaced by other trends. Thus I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation [German Trost]: for at bottom that is what they are all demanding – the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most virtuous believers.¹

In this paragraph, one could say that Freud reminds us of Stig Dagerman’s condensed text and his claim that »Our need for consolation is insatiable«.² He wrote his text 22 years after Freud used the word consolation. I believe that Freud would have agreed with Dagerman that »consolation is as brief as the breeze, blowing through the crown of a tree«. He would probably share Stig Dagerman’s view, that money lends no consolation – or, more precisely – that he, like Dagerman, doesn’t care about money. Freud maintained that only the recurrence of a childhood wish could give genuine consolation or be a satisfying experience.

According to Freud, the craving for money is not a wish stemming from childhood, but rather a wish that the individual acquires later in life, in a society that very much values money and what money can buy. However, Freud would not see eye to eye with Stig Dagerman when the latter claims not to value whether he contributes to the improvement of literature or not. For Freud, the idea of being one of the group of important scientific authors who contributed to solving the crucial and challenging enigmas of life was deeply meaningful. That may well have been the most important driving force in his life, and he found meaning and consolation in his intellectual work. It was a reason for living.

The reason for living that Stig Dagerman seeks in his text »Our need for consolation is insatiable...« – and which he sought in his life – carries with it an impossibility, which, one could say, led him to a life of searching without ever really finding. His wounded soul remained inconsolable and, at the same time, the inconsolable part of him made him capable of writing one of the most beautiful texts in the history of literature on man’s need for consolation.

¹ Psychoanalysis has seldom occupied itself with the notion of consolation theoretically, and there is little written on the subject. The category itself – the word, term or concept – is
not a part of the obvious theoretical canon for psychoanalysts or writers within the psychoanalytic tradition.

Freud uses the word Trost only once, in the passage quoted above. There, as we noticed, it is used in the context of pointing out that the need for consolation is a deeply rooted, ever-present human need. Hence, it is in his general reflections on the human condition that the word ‘consolation’ comes to the fore, not in connection with the key concepts that constitute psychoanalytic theory. And Freud did not develop his once stated idea that the need for consolation is a deeply rooted, ever-present human need.

In other words consolation, or comfort or soothing or solace, is not a psychoanalytic concept. None of them are mentioned in the fundamental work, The Language of Psycho-analysis, by J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, published in English in 1973. Likewise, it doesn’t figure in Elisabeth Roudinesco’s and Michel Plon’s Dictionnaire de la Psychanalyse (1997/2013). Neither can you find it in Alain de Mijolla’s Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse (2002, 2013).

Why is that? It has to do with reasons that are part of the problem, and that contribute to making the question a difficult one to answer; partly it is a symptom within the psychoanalytic theory and movement. But I’ll try to give a hint of an answer.

For the founder of psychoanalysis, the phenomenon behind words like ‘consolation’, ‘soothing’, ‘solace’ or ‘comfort’, is connected to a deeply rooted human need. Thus, the word, which has never reached the status of a term, or a concept, doesn’t figure in accounts of the psychoanalytical practice as it is described in the technical writings, which Freud published between the years 1904 and 1937.

A psychoanalysis is supposed to make a person less infantile and more aware, more conscious of his or her motives and incentives. The psychoanalytical effort is meant to make the individual’s unconscious conscious, make him or her mend and bridge memory gaps, give the ego access to parts of the id, lessen the power of the superego, and rid the mind of incestuous ties. It aims to make it possible for an individual human being to be able to love and to work, to have a sexual life which combines pleasure and tenderness, to release psychological energy in constructive activities, to find a way to reconciliation with his or her personal history and destiny, and not be locked in destructive repetition and/or psychopathology.

In this work, there is no priority given to the notion that what the analysand needs or should be provided with is consolation. The analysand is described as a potentially rational being who, through the analytical work, becomes wiser, gains more knowledge about him- or herself, and whose actions as a result will be less limited. Or, to use a term from the French tradition – the individual learns to recognize his or her desire.
We know, if we stay close to both Freud’s point of view and that of French psychoanalysis, that what an analysis is about is the following: the analysand is given permission to talk about his or her irrational side. In other words, about that part of an individual’s psyche that drives him or her to actions, thoughts or decisions, whose unwanted consequences may in turn make the individual seek analysis.

The analysand needs to trust his psychoanalyst and submit to the task of working together with the latter, so that he or she can gain new knowledge. The analysand’s task – and seen from another point of view, also that of the psychoanalyst – is reminiscent of the work of a researcher or a scholar, whose task is to carry out his or her project; in other words, he or she shouldn’t abandon the striving to find new and more profound knowledge. It’s the first priority.

In accordance with the Gospel of John, it is in the truth we will find liberation. In this regard, Freud is part of the Enlightenment, the project in which prejudice, religious ideas and religious faith will be replaced with rational thought and empirical investigation, aiming for the truth. With that as a point of departure, the word consolation becomes incompatible with the psychoanalytic theory. Consolation is too much a part of the infantile register, and religion is, according to psychoanalytic tradition, tainted by this register. At the same time, we must point out that it is precisely this aspect, the far reaching effects of the infantile register, which in the history of ideas is one of Freud’s essential contributions; he studied the child in and within the adult, and how this infantile residue continued to affect the person’s life.

But what about the psychoanalytic practice? What do people expect and what does an analytic experience entail? It’s hard to imagine that a person who goes through a lengthy psychoanalysis would not come into contact with parts of his or her childhood, including feelings, wishes and needs which are normally repressed in daily life. He or she would want to be in contact with, and express, these sides to a larger extent than before. But expressing these sides also means risking problems. Making an analytic journey is the same as making a journey in time, to access and acquaint oneself with the infantile side of one’s personality, the regressive part of oneself.

A fundamental psychoanalytic idea is that some of the so-called psychopathological manifestations are the result of an inner grief which has not been allowed expression. You could also say that the person in question has not received consolation or comfort in any fundamental or meaningful way. Or that the consolation has failed to bring a real and lasting consolation. The inconsolable one, the one who disconsolately seeks consolation, has not been reconciled with his or her destiny, or has been incapable of dealing with his or her disillusionment.
The person who is inconsolable has not been able to surmount his or her disappointments. As a consequence that person is forced to create and will create some form of psychopathology or psychological suffering. In this process it’s not unreasonable to assume that disconsolate patients in psychoanalysis are looking for consolation, even though – on a manifest level – they wouldn’t explicitly express themselves that way, most of them expecting their psychoanalyst to have nothing or little to share with his or her analysand with regard to the question of consolation. But failing to express a wish to be comforted should not be taken as proof that they have nothing to say about consolation or comfort, or that they are saying everything that’s on their minds with regard to consolation or comfort, and therefore are not seeking consolation.

Freud has a fundamental thought: man must abstain. It is by abstaining that man becomes human. By abstaining man is forced to partly compensate through fantasy. From one point of view you might say that fantasies, like dreams, provide consolation. In fantasy you are compensated for what you’re forced to forgo in real life, and it will provide consolation. To be disconsolate is man’s predicament. Here we may think of Stig Dagerman, when he wrote that in a situation that offers no consolation, the need for consolation may seem infinite. Man is by definition doomed to find substitute activities and, from one point of view, it is not unreasonable to regard these substitute activities as attempts to find consolation.

In other words, within the psychoanalytic tradition we must distinguish between, on the one hand, the use of the word consolation, and on the other hand, seeking consolation without recognizing that search for what it is.

The question is rather: what place is given to consolation in psychoanalytic thinking and in the psychoanalytic practice? There are a few signs of older date than Totem and Taboo (1912-1913), indicating Freud’s interest in the question of religion, not least in an article from 1907 about compulsive acts and religious practice. But there’s a key statement, which points forward towards Totem and Taboo; it can be found in a letter to Sándor Ferenczi from New Years Day, 1910. In that letter Freud writes that religion is ultimately founded on man’s sense of infantile helplessness. Let that be our point of departure.

—— PSYCHOANALYSIS, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION ——

Freud’s most important text on the question of religion and his own way of relating to religion is his work, Die Zukunft einer Illusion, published in 1927. In this work we find a description of the specific characteristics of science and an analysis of religion, where the latter is compared with science. His
analysis leads him to the conclusion that religion must be regarded as an illusion.

While discussing the reproach – real as well as imagined – which has already befallen other strong criticism of religion and which might befall the adamant criticism that he himself is delivering, he also clarifies the nature of psychoanalysis. In the first chapter, where he lays down the general outline of his text, Freud also defines the place that, in his mind, ‘science’ occupies. In his analysis of religion, he consistently uses the category ‘science’ as a concept which is possible to place in opposition to the concept ‘religion’, and he does not divide science into different disciplines or categories, like, for example the natural sciences, the social sciences and the human sciences.

Religion is characterized as an illusion and an expression of the wishful thinking helpless humans are known to engage in. His text, Freud tells us, aims at showing the necessity of taking a step out into reality, which for him means abandoning religion, and taking on what he calls the hostile reality, and approaching things rationally and scientifically. However, science too has its limits, he claims. It will not provide us with answers to the mystery of the Universe. Also, scientific research is a slow process. Scientific work is nevertheless the only road which will take us to knowledge about the reality of the world that surrounds us.5

The scientific approach is forced to rely on observations and reflective thinking. Freud takes another step and claims that nothing shall stop psychoanalytic research from turning our powers of observation towards our own being or from criticizing ourselves. This perspective opens up to the possibility of building an outlook on life, a world view.6

Freud’s view is that the influence of religion on human beings is diminishing compared to how it used to be. The reason for this must be sought, according to Freud, in the strengthening of the scientific spirit in individuals from what Freud calls the upper strata of society, something that will, among other things, make the promises of religion less credible to them. The criticism has weakened the validity of the religious documents as evidence, according to Freud.7 This process will come naturally, and there is no reason for educated people and intellectuals to fear it. It is, on the other hand, understandable if the large masses of uneducated and oppressed people will fear such a change: since they have not themselves undergone this process of change, they are consequently not ready to accept the results of scientific thinking.

In the final chapter of the book, the consequences of the controversy with religion are discussed and certain reservations are added. These reservations show traces of doubts regarding the faith in science, stated earlier in the book. Freud
concedes that, possibly, also his own thoughts about the future and the place he gives science could be of an illusory nature. In that case, it is a kind of illusion with a decisive advantage; it can be corrected if experience tells us that a mistake has been made.

Both the idea that religion resembles a childhood neurosis, and the assumption that humanity will overcome this neurotic period in the same manner that many children grow out of their childhood neurosis all by themselves, will be tested by time. If, in time, these assumptions should prove inaccurate, they will have to be relinquished.

The insights from individual psychology, Freud tells us, are possibly incomplete, and their application on humanity not defendable. We have here, he states, a large degree of uncertainty, but this uncertainty – and that is the important thing – does not make religion more credible. In this analysis human intellect and human instincts are opposed. Despite the fact that the intellect is weak compared to the instincts, its voice keeps insisting to be heard. It won’t cease until it has reached its goal. According to Freud, this is cause for optimism.

He takes this thought to its extreme and claims: in the end, nothing can resist reason and experience, and the extent to which religion goes against both is all too evident. Freud claims in this context to have one god, Logos, and he relates this god of his to Ananke, i.e. necessity. True, Logos is not omnipotent, but Freud still believes in the possibility of exploring and finding out about the world, and that scientific work can bring clarity about the things of this world. In that way humanity will have more power over the world, and it can choose which way to go accordingly.

This is his opinion, and to the extent that this opinion could be an illusion, the scientist and those who trust in the results of science find themselves in the same situation as those who believe in religion. But he insists that science through external, numerous and important results has proven not to be an illusion.

Science has many open and even more secret enemies because it has criticized religion and threatened to destroy its dominance. Science is accused of having achieved so little and left so much unsolved and in obscurity. That amounts to forgetting that the beginnings have been difficult, and that science is still young, and that the time during which the human intellect has been occupied with scientific tasks is short. Changes of scientific opinions happen through evolution and progress, not through revolution. An incomplete approximation of the truth will be replaced by a more accurate one. In some areas, scientific research has not yet passed the phase where some fundamental assumptions have to be abandoned, but within other fields, research has gained a stable nucleus.
Freud also addresses the accusation against science that its results can only ever be subjective, while the real nature of things remains inaccessible. This is also an erroneous way of looking at things, since the psychological apparatus develops through striving for knowledge about the external world.

Following this line of thought, Freud goes on to the conclusion that the problem with discussing the nature of the world without taking the mental apparatus into account is nothing but an empty abstraction without practical value. In Freud’s analysis of religion, science, because of its characteristics, is placed in opposition to the latter, in comparison with which it appears like a negative. In this context it is – with regard to Freud’s way of using the term science – possible to replace it with psychoanalysis. Science and psychoanalysis are in the same situation. They have common methods and common interests, he writes.

Religion is given the status of a phenomenon reminiscent of a delusion; it is therefore possible to analyze and thus also possible to connect to the three fundamental psychoanalytic concepts. Science, on the other hand, is not possible to analyze under similar premises. Religion is not an individual but a shared neurosis, and it is tied to a complex of problems typical of one of the two main types of neuroses that Freud studied during the better part of his productive life, namely the obsessional neurosis. The adult religious believer resembles a big child, not daring to leave its original family, choosing instead to cling to it.

There is also the possibility, he writes, that the promises of science are exaggerated. To the extent that science is an illusion – which Freud claims religion to be, according to the evidence – experience will provide the evidence that will prove certain assumptions illusory, and the consequence will be the abandonment – as self-evident as necessary – of those faulty assumptions.

However, science has only been around for a relatively short period of time, and one may reasonably hold hopes for the future. The intellect can temporarily prove to be weaker than the instincts or the drives; in the long run, however, the intellect will prevail, since its insistence has a kind unrelenting quality; it will continue to insist even in the face of resistance. This is a text in which Freud holds the idea that knowledge grows slowly, continuously, and that it accumulates. This process will, among other things, erode the credibility of religion.

It’s of interest that Freud couples his text on lay analysis with the one on religion as an illusion.

In a letter to Oskar Pfister, dated November 25 1928, he writes that there is a connection between Die Frage der Laienanalyse (1926) and Die Zukunft einer Illusion, one written to
The Swedish Psychoanalytic Society, associated with the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) was created and has been located in Stockholm since 1934. Five years later, in 1939, again in Stockholm, St. Lukas was founded. To be precise, the foundation ‘Serenity and Strength’ was founded in Stockholm in March 1939, and in November 1940, it changed its name to the St. Lukas foundation. St. Lukas started its first local branch in 1946, in Gothenburg. It has been, and is still, an association that has trained psychodynamic psychotherapists. It also offers psychotherapeutic treatment. St. Lukas has had great importance for the psychodynamic tradition in Sweden; at present it has more than 30 local branches all over Sweden. Moreover, it is characterized by a large interest in existential, religious and philosophical questions. Today, St. Lukas tries to be up-dated from an academic standpoint.

In their book, Själens vård och psykologin (1996) [Pastoral cure and psychology], Carl-Erik Brattemo and Sixten Lundgren describe, among other things, the original purpose of St. Lukas, which also was »to guide, in different ways, both the healthy and the ailing towards a better understanding of the importance of spiritual factors for bodily and spiritual health«. Within the group of Christian doctors who took part in the foundation of St. Lukas were the neurologist Richard Eeg-Olofsson, the psychiatrist Curt Åmark, and the lung specialist Gösta Birath. Furthermore, the Methodist pastor and psychotherapist Göte Bergsten, as well as the trained social worker and author Ebba Pauli (1873–1941), would have a decisive importance for the creation of the foundation. Bergsten was the first director and superintendent of St. Lukas.

In May, 1944, the purpose of St. Lukas developed further into the following:

The main purpose of St. Lukas, which is a Christian ecumenical association of clergymen, doctors and laymen, is to provide care for the needy sick, particularly those whose ailments have their roots in states of psychological conflict and weakness. For that purpose the Foundation wants to establish and run institutes for pastoral cure and psychological counseling, and also acquire, own and run hostels and nursing homes.
On the first of August, 1944, on Ordenstrappan in Stockholm, St. Lukas opened the first of its institutes. The foundation would, according to Bergsten, provide pastoral cure founded on modern psychology, while at the same time maintaining the essential elements of Christian pastoral cure. St. Lukas was open to doctors, clergy, psychologists and trained social workers. In his book, *Psykologin och självens vård* (1945) [Psychology and cure of souls], Bergsten has an open attitude towards the psychoanalytical ideas, but his openness is one with reservations. The book – of more than 400 pages – drew a lot of attention and was also published in Norway, England, and the USA. The text is profound and the author's attitude is problematizing with an intellectual touch. You could argue that St. Lukas was founded in the wake of the creation of the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society and operating in the field that was opened by Freud's psychoanalysis. St. Lukas can perhaps be seen as an example of how the psychoanalytic tradition and practice, through the connection to existential and religious questions, could approach the category of consolation.

St. Lukas was created in an atmosphere of increasing interest in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic theory, but it is important to remember that the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society had a distinctly atheistic stance. There were a number of doctors in Sweden in the middle of the 1930s who had an interest in psychodynamic theory, but didn’t feel at home in an atheistic, intellectual and to some extent dogmatic environment. They had religious beliefs themselves, and they had met patients with thoughts and experiences of God and phenomena pertaining to religious issues. They felt the need for a forum where there was room for the kind of questions that they had.

There were also Christian theologians who were genuinely interested in the psychoanalytic and the psychodynamic theory and who needed to meet doctors who had the unquestionable authority to speak on behalf of, and treat, those afflicted by mental suffering. They wanted help to create a psychotherapeutic movement that was more in accordance with their Christian philosophy and belief.

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**THE TRANSITIONAL OBJECT**

As I stated earlier, the question of consolation is not a simple one, and psychoanalysis lacks a clarifying, central concept for what we in everyday life call consolation. From the beginning there was almost no interest at all in understanding the need of consolation. Nonetheless, Donald W. Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object must be considered in this context. According to Winnicott, the transitional object is on the border between psychic, subjective reality, and external, objective reality. It is usually used by the child of the age of four to twelve months. The transitional object is oral, in the sense that the
child likes to take it in its mouth, and also suck on it. It functions, according to Winnicott, as part of a normal passage in the child’s development. The transitional object has a status between the child’s oral relation to the breast, and subsequent object relations; it is on the border between the subjective and the objective. Winnicott proposes that the transitional object functions as an illusion, precisely because it draws its strength both from the inner world of the child and from external reality, worlds which the child cannot clearly distinguish between. It is also an object that the child develops a strong attachment to.

Often, the child will want to have access to the object at bedtime, but its function is also called upon when the child is frustrated or seeking consolation. It would seem that the transitional object has precisely the capacity to give consolation. Traces of the presence of the transitional object can appear in the adult in states such as sadness and depression; it can also be traced as an element in the sexual life of the adult, in the form of a fetish, according to Winnicott.

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It is important to point out that the concept of the transitional object, when used by psychoanalysts and psychodynamically oriented psychotherapists, tends to become a technical term and a concrete object that fails to capture – in Dagerman’s words – mankind’s need for consolation. In the worst case, the transitional object is interpreted as though there could be a ritual solution to mankind’s need for consolation. It’s also important to stress that the transitional object, according to the theory, is closely related to the child’s separation from the mother. The concept is included in the theory of the child’s psychological development, and its striving after autonomy.

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**CONCLUSION**

In Freud’s scientific-ideological attempt at turning psychoanalysis into a pure scientific discipline, phenomena that were, and to a large extent still are, parts of a kind of thinking belonging to the religious or literary fields, are lost. The human need of consolation is such a phenomenon. But this phenomenon, the need of consolation, doesn’t disappear as a result of a failure to conceptualize it, and thus exclude it from the psychoanalytic conceptual framework.19

The practicing psychoanalyst, who regularly meets the child in the adult, will, however, in the course of this thorough and lasting work encounter the human need for consolation, a need that can show itself in different guises; it can be denied, foreclosed/rejected, repressed, or acknowledged by the individual.

It is probably an illusion to think that an adult – even the well analyzed and mature adult – would be able to walk through life without ever being reacquainted with the child’s unappeasable need for consolation. Freud was well aware of the implications
of the quote with which I opened this paper. But his belief in the need to rid psychoanalysis of all religious influences made him unwilling to take any other stance with regard to humans’ more or less eternal need for consolation than the one he chose.

Freud took his own adversities and misfortunes in life stoically – the death of one of his children; the death of his grandchild; the recurring offences to which he was subjected due to his Jewish origin and affinity, being forced into exile in June 1938; the fact that he was stricken with grave illness, a cancer of the jaw; and the fact that, like all of us, he lived with the disappointments of ordinary life. And he did not write about the need for consolation. Maybe he did not dare to think and write about what he once stated; that fundamentally, consolation is what we are all demanding – »the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most virtuous believers«.

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3 His English translator chooses the term ‘consolation’.
4 The term in German is *der Analysierte*. Sigmund Freud used this term irregularly for his patients. I have chosen to use the word analysand in the article.
7 Freud: SE XXI, 38.
8 Freud: SE XXI, 53.
9 Freud: SE XXI, 54.
10 Freud: SE XXI, 55.
11 Freud: SE XXI, 55.
12 Freud: SE XXI, 56.
13 Freud uses the German word *Trieb*, and two English words – instinct and drive – have been used for the German word *Trieb*.
14 The same year and in the same city, the Erica Foundation was born. The function of this institution, operating in Stockholm, was, and still is, to train child psychotherapists within a psychodynamic tradition.
15 Its first president was the Professor of Surgery, Knut Harald Giertz.
16 He was the one who was associated with the foundation of the institution, and he was also the publicly most noted of the founders of St. Lukas.
17 Göte Bergsten became its director, spiritual adviser and therapist.
18 It did however take a course of its own.
19 The need for consolation doesn’t reach the status of an idea, or a term, and even less the status of a concept.

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